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The Good, the Bad and the Ugly:
A Study of Security Decisions in a
Cyber-Physical Systems Game
Sylvain Frey, Awais Rashid, Pauline Anthonysamy, Maria Pinto-Albuquerque, and Syed Asad Naqvi
Abstract—Stakeholders’ security decisions play a fundamental role in determining security requirements, yet, little is currently
understood about how different stakeholder groups within an organisation approach security and the drivers and tacit biases
underpinning their decisions. We studied and contrasted the security decisions of three demographics – security experts, computer
scientists and managers – when playing a tabletop game that we designed and developed. The game tasks players with managing the
security of a cyber-physical environment while facing various threats. Analysis of 12 groups of players (4 groups in each of our
demographics) reveals strategies that repeat in particular demographics, e.g., managers and security experts generally favoring
technological solutions over personnel training, which computer scientists preferred. Surprisingly, security experts were not ipso facto
better players – in some cases, they made very questionable decisions – yet they showed a higher level of confidence in themselves. We
classified players’ decision-making processes, i.e., procedure-, experience-, scenario- or intuition-driven. We identified decision patterns,
both good practices and typical errors and pitfalls. Our game provides a requirements sandbox in which players can experiment with
security risks, learn about decision-making and its consequences, and reflect on their own perception of security.
Index Terms—Security decisions; security requirements; game; decision patterns.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The security of any system is a direct consequence of stake-
holders’ decisions regarding security requirements and their
relative prioritization. Such decisions are taken with varying
degrees of expertise in security. In some organizations –
particularly those with resources – these are the preserve
of computer (or information) security teams. In others –
typically smaller organizations – the computing services team
may be charged with the responsibility. Often managers have
a role to play as guardians of business targets and goals. Be
it common workplace practices or strategic decision making,
security decisions underpin not only the initial security
requirements and their prioritization but also the adaptation
and evolution of these requirements as new business or
security contexts arise.
However, little is currently understood about how these
various demographics approach cyber security decisions
and the strategies and approaches that underpin those
decisions. What are the typical decision patterns, if any, the
consequences of such patterns and their impact (positive or
negative) on the security of the system in question? Nor is
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there any substantial understanding of how the strategies
and decision patterns of these different groups contrast. Is
security expertise necessarily an advantage when making
security decisions in a given context? Answers to these
questions are key to understanding the “how” and “why”
behind security decision processes.
In this paper, we propose a tabletop game – Decisions
and Disruptions (D-D)1 – as a means to investigate these very
questions. The game tasks a group of players with managing
the security of a small utility company while facing a variety
of threats. The game provides a requirements sandbox in
which players can experiment with threats, learn about
decision making and its consequences, and reflect on their
own perception of risk. The game is intentionally kept short
– 2 hours – and simple enough to be played without prior
training. A cyber-physical infrastructure, depicted through
a Lego® board, makes the game easy to understand and
accessible to players from varying backgrounds and security
expertise, without being too trivial a setting for security
experts. The particular setting of a utility infrastructure is
drawn from our prior experience of technical [26], [27] and
non-technical investigations [28] as well as interviews with
security experts, field engineers, IT users in such settings [29].
Our work complements existing work on gamification
as a means to improve security awareness, education and
training [9], [13]. While there is a definite educational and
awareness-raising aspect to D-D (as noted consistently by
players in all our subject groups), our focus in this paper is on
contrasting the security decisions of the three demographics
as they manifested in the game sessions. Existing work,
e.g., [20], has demonstrated such use of games as an effective
1. Game rules available at: http://decisions-disruptions.org.
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means to study decision processes of diverse stakeholders.
Specifically, the tangible, physical board enables players to
manipulate security features and observe the consequences of
their decisions. Recording and analysis of these discussions
and interactions provides a rich data source to study their
decision strategies, processes and patterns.
We report on insights gained from playing D-D with
43 players divided into homogeneous groups (group sizes
of 2-6 players): 4 groups of security experts, 4 groups of
non-technical managers and 4 groups of general computer
scientists. Such observations should, of course, not be gen-
eralized, however, the substantial sample size enables in-
depth qualitative analysis. Our analysis reveals a number
of novel insights regarding security decisions of our three
demographics:
• Strategies: Security experts had a strong interest in
advanced technological solutions and tended to neglect
intelligence gathering, to their own detriment: some
security expert teams achieved poor results in the game.
Managers, too, were technology-driven and focused
on data protection while neglecting human factors
more than other groups. Computer scientists tended
to balance human factors and intelligence gathering
with technical solutions, and achieved the best results of
the three demographics.
• Decision Processes: Technical experience significantly
changes the way players think. Teams with little techni-
cal experience had shallow, intuition-driven discussions
with few concrete arguments. Technical teams, and the
most experienced in particular, had much richer debates,
driven by concrete scenarios, anecdotes from experience
and procedural thinking. Security experts showed a
high confidence in their decisions – despite some of
them having bad consequences – while the other groups
tended to doubt their own skills – even when they were
playing good games.
• Patterns: A number of characteristic plays could be
identified, some good (balance between priorities, open-
mindedness and adapting strategies based on inputs that
challenge one’s pre-conceptions), some bad (excessive
focus on particular issues, confidence in charismatic
leaders), some ugly (“tunnel vision” syndrome by over-
confident players). We document and discuss these
patterns, showing the virtue of the positive ones, dis-
couraging the negative ones, and inviting the readers to
do their own introspection.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we situate our work with respect to the literature on security
decisions and security games. Section 3 presents D-D, its
game model and rules. This is followed by a description of
our subject groups and the analysis approach used to study
their security decisions in Section 4. Section 5 presents the
strategies that drove decisions of various groups. Section 6
discusses whether groups’ (and particular demographics’) ap-
proaches were procedure-, experience-, scenario- or intuition-
driven. Section 7 presents decision patterns – the Good, the
Bad and the Ugly – i.e., the patterns that yield better results
than others and the clear mistakes and pitfalls to be avoided.
Section 8 discusses threats to validity and limitations of our
study. Finally, we discuss the possibilities offered by D-D
beyond this particular experiment (Section 9).
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Security decisions
A key challenge faced by any organization is the need for
optimal investment in security with respect to the threats it is
likely to face. Consequently, balancing various factors, such
as costs, against potential threats and their likelihood is a key
concern. One of the initial metrics for measuring computer
related risks was the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE), which
was developed by the U.S.- National Bureau of Standards
in 1975 [17]. The ALE is an annual expected financial loss to
an organization’s information assets because of a particular
threat occurring within that same calendar year. Several
information security investment decision support methods
have been proposed, e.g., [6], [12], some of them based on
the ALE metric, e.g., [21]. Within D-D we aim to capture
this realism of security decision-making—balancing priorities
between various threats and investments is a key element in
the gameplay.
Bodin et al. [5] introduced the PCR (Perceived Composite
Risk) approach. They used the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) to weight and combine different risk measures into
a single composite metric for risk analysis. This composite
metric supports decision-makers by capturing and balancing
the various risk measures that apply to their organization.
Baker et al. [4] proposed an event-chain risk management
model in which threats are “measured as rates per year
and then converted into outcomes by specifying the number
or extent per year.” While these works focus on providing
decision support tools, the focus of our paper is to study
and contrast such decisions between different demographics
(with varying levels of expertise and knowledge in security).
Research has also demonstrated that a better integration
is necessary between business and security perspectives.
Corriss [8] has shown that management usually considers
information security governance as under the jurisdiction
of their information technology department, separate from
corporate governance. Coles-Kemp et al. [7] have highlighted
the importance of relating security and business risk. They
showed that many businesses do not have the tools to
relate security risks to business risks and objectives, and
that the use of a facilitator can help them understand and
better communicate security risks and help embed security
management into business practices. Similarly, Anderson [1]
notes that an important step to protect an organization’s data
is for managers to promote security awareness by “creating
a culture where the community has the knowledge (what
to do), skill (how to do it), and attitude (desire to do it)”.
These works demonstrate the value of improving security
awareness, education and training while bridging corporate
and security cultures. The insights resulting from our study
are an important contribution in this direction.
2.2 Games
Games have been used as research tools in various domains.
Space Fortress [10] is a video game that was developed
by cognitive psychologists to understand human cognition
and performance. The famous Tetris game has been used to
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investigate the differences in the actions humans perform
from a cognitive perspective [15].
Military organizations and cyber security companies
have developed games to improve security awareness and
education. Although the form may differ (tabletop, role
playing, video game), they are based on a narrative similar to
D-D: players are placed in an immersive environment where
they must take decisions which require balancing business
and technical constraints. Examples include CyberCIEGE
[13]: a video game created by the US Naval Postgraduate
School that tasks players with managing an IT organiza-
tion, with the goal of maintaining user productivity while
investing resources in necessary security protections against
various attack scenarios. The Kaspersky Industrial Protection
Simulation is another example: a board role playing game
that defines itself as a “Security Monopoly” for maximizing
enterprise revenue while building an industrial security
capability and dealing with unexpected cyber events despite
uncertain information and limited resources.
Similar to model games such as miniature war games,
D-D provides players with a physical replication of the
context in appreciation: players are able to visualize and
manipulate elements of the infrastructure, which facilitates
immersion. Lego®, in particular, has been used as a support
for redesigning the organization of an industrial facility [24]
and for teaching engineering principles [3].
Games have been used in education settings in numerous
knowledge areas. Examples in software engineering include
teaching software processes [18], [19], value-based software
engineering [14], software process risk management [25],
and requirements engineering good practices [23]. In [20], a
jigsaw puzzle-based game is used to perform analysis and
resolution of conflicts among stakeholders, showing how a
game can involve players into activities usually considered
boring or technical.
In the security domain, Beckers et al. [2] propose a game
to capture specific security requirements – in their case
pertaining to social engineering. In contrast, D-D focuses
on enabling stakeholders to manipulate security features and
observe the consequences of their decisions, leading to an
improved understanding of both security risks and the trade-
offs resulting from particular decisions. Control-Alt-Hack [9]
is a tabletop card game where players take on the role of
white-hat hackers. The evaluation suggests that Control-Alt-
Hack represents an effective model for disseminating ideas
and encouraging interest in computer security. Although
the primary focus of this paper is on contrasting security
decisions of various groups, D-D also has a high potential
for educational purposes as discussed in Section 9.
3 D-D: THE RULES OF THE GAME
3.1 Overview
D-D is meant to be played by a team of 2 to 6 players,
under the direction of a Game Master. The players act as the
team in charge of cyber security in a small utility company,
with the goal of minimizing security incidents. The Game
Master enforces the rules and guides the players through the
4 rounds of the game. Each round – equivalent to 2 months
in game time – is composed of the following steps:
1) The Game Master describes the state of the company and
the different systems in the infrastructure (cf. section 3.2).
2) The players are given a budget ($100,000) and a number
of possible defenses to invest in, such as firewalls,
antivirus, threat assessment (cf. section 3.3).
3) The players debate which defenses are more appropriate
and decide by consensus where to invest their budget.
4) The Game Master tells the players about the effects
of their investments: whether their defenses deflect
any attacks, and the effects of undefended attacks (cf.
section 3.4). In addition to technical consequences, the
share price of the company can be affected by successful
attacks.
3.2 The game board
The game board represents the players’ infrastructure (cf.
Figures 1 and 2). It is composed of two parts: the field site
(or plant) and the office. The field site is where the industrial
process takes place. A couple of water turbines are controlled
by a SCADA controller, operated by local technicians and
engineers. A set of PCs used by local personnel and a
database collecting production data sit on the field site’s
network. This local network is connected to the Internet in
order to send strategic information to the office network,
where the CEO, a part of the engineering team, and the
human resources sit. The office network also hosts a number
of PCs, as well as a server and a database: the company runs
its own email service and website locally.
3.3 Defenses
Each round, the players are given a budget of $100,000 plus
any unspent money from the previous round. Initially, the
players can choose to invest among the defenses shown in
Table 1. When they choose to invest in an Asset Audit, the
Game Master uncovers additional defenses shown in Table 2.
It is explained upfront to the players that the costs of
defenses in D-D do not reflect the actual costs of such
defenses in practice. Instead, they are designed so that,
with a $100,000 budget per turn and a standard price of
$30,000 per defense, players can invest in 3 defenses each turn
on average. Players must therefore prioritize their choices,
hence enabling the study of their security decision strategies
and processes. CCTV and Network Monitoring cost more
($50,000 each) to give these defenses an aura of “advanced
technology”, that we later use to measure how much players
are attracted to sophisticated security solutions (cf. section 5).
Threat Assessment and Encryption cost less ($20,000) for the
sake of game balance, as they are perceived as less powerful
than other defenses.
3.4 Attacks
Each round, the Game Master runs a number of attacks
against the players’ infrastructure, inspired by real-world
threat reports [16], [22] and subsequently validated by the
security experts who played the game. Attacks are carried
out by three categories of attackers:
• Script kiddies using basic attacks (scans, DoS, phishing,
server exploits) on public targets (the company web
server and email addresses).
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Fig. 1. Overview of the game board.
Fig. 2. The plant.
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TABLE 1
Initial defenses available to the players.
CCTV - plant ($50,000) Surveillance cameras and alarms that will automatically warn security guards of a physical intrusion in
the plant.
CCTV - offices ($50,000) Surveillance cameras and alarms that will automatically warn security guards of a physical intrusion in
the offices.
Network monitor - plant ($50,000) An advanced software and hardware solution that monitors all traffic on the plant network and detects
ongoing attacks.
Network monitor - offices ($50,000) An advanced software and hardware solution that monitors all traffic on the office network and detects
ongoing attacks.
Firewall - plant ($30,000) A software and hardware solution that monitors and filters unauthorized traffic coming from the
Internet to the plant network.
Firewall - offices ($30,000) A software and hardware solution that monitors and filters unauthorized traffic coming from the
Internet to the office network.
Anti-virus ($30,000) A software protection against malware for all PCs (plant and offices).
Security Training ($30,000) Basic security hygiene for all employees (plant and offices).
Asset Audit ($30,000) Detailed evaluation of the company’s infrastructure, reveals and shuts down an open wifi network on
the plant, and unlocks additional defenses (cf. Table 2).
Threat Assessment ($20,000) Detailed information about possible threats and attacks against the company.
TABLE 2
Additional defenses available after an Asset Audit.
Patches - Controller ($30,000) Upgrade to the firmware of the SCADA controller.
Patches - PCs ($30,000) Upgrade to the operating system of all PCs (plant and offices).
Patches - Server & DBs ($30,000) Upgrade to the operating system of the server and databases (plant and offices).
Encryption - PCs ($20,000) Encryption for all PCs (plant and offices).
Encryption - databases ($20,000) Encryption for all databases (plant and offices).
• Organized crime using more advanced techniques (spear
phishing, infected USB drives, infiltration via an insecure
wifi network) to achieve more advanced goals (data
exfiltration from the offices and plant, ransom based on
controller disruption).
• Nation states using the most advanced attacks to exfiltrate
technical data from the plant and disrupt the controller.
If the players invest in a Threat Assessment, the Game
Master tells them about these three types of attackers and the
type of attacks and goals associated with them. Script kiddies
are “100% likely” to hit the company, Organized Crime
attacks are “quite likely” whereas nation states attacks are
“unlikely and nearly impossible to defend against anyway”.
The players are, therefore, encouraged not to focus on high-
profile attacks and to make sure that the organization and
its infrastructure is properly secure against the most likely
threats.
Each attacker follows a particular attack progression,
depicted in Table 3. It is important to note that the players do
not have access to this table: a Threat Assessment gives them
high-level information about the attackers, their methods
and the associated likelihood, but no specific timings or
progressions. Most attacks are initially silent unless the
players have invested in the proper type of defense: for
instance, Network Scans go undetected unless Firewalls are
deployed, Phishing attacks are silently successful unless
Security Training has been purchased for employees. Visible
attack effects hit the infrastructure when it is too late: DoS
attack paralyzing an un-firewalled server, viruses disrupting
PCs, or a ransom for releasing stolen data.
The attacks are designed so that low-level attacks (DoS,
simple virus by Script Kiddies at round 2 and 3) hit early
to assess whether the players invested in security essentials
against the most common threats. More sophisticated attacks
follow an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) life-cycle. These
attacks hit later (data exfiltration, controller disruption in
round 4) to assess whether players can prioritize between less
frequent, sophisticated attacks and frequent, low-level threats
(Script Kiddies in rounds 1, 2). The effect on the company’s
share price is also proportional to the sophistication of the
attack: small bump when hit by a Script Kiddie, significant
dip when hit by Organized Crime (along with mentions
by the Game Master of press articles and headlines in the
news). The Nation State attacks are revealed at the end of
round 4 only, when the game finishes: the Game Master then
mentions to the players that they were not expected to be
able to defend against them.
The possibility of adding an element of randomness to the
attack scenarios was considered for its realism, but discarded
as it would have biased the comparison between sessions,
since groups would not have faced the same attacks.
3.5 Validation of the game model
The models of the company’s infrastructure and the attacks
targeting it are central elements that determine the game’s
realism and fairness. The cyber physical infrastructure must
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TABLE 3
Attacks targeting the infrastructure and the corresponding counters (defenses) noted × in the table.
Attacker Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Scanning Kiddie Scan offices
× Firewall offices
Scan offices
× Firewall offices
Scan offices
× Firewall offices
Scan offices
× Firewall offices
DoSing Kiddie DoS offices
× Firewall offices
DoS offices
× Firewall offices
DoS offices
× Firewall offices
Hacking Kiddie Remote control server
× Server patch
Data exfiltration server
× Net. mon. offices
× Encryption DB
Data exfiltration server
× Net. mon. offices
× Encryption DB
Phishing Kiddie Phishing offices (trojan)
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Phishing offices (trojan)
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Malware Kiddie Disruption PC offices
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Disruption PC offices
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
Disruption PC offices
× Training
× Antivirus
× Patches PCs
APT PC Offices Infected USB offices
× Training
× Antivirus
Remote Control PC
× Antivirus
× Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration PC
× Antivirus
× Encryption PCs
× Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration PC
× Antivirus
× Encryption PCs
× Net. mon. offices
APT Server Offices Phishing office credentials
× Training
Remote Control Server
× Net. mon. offices
Data exfiltration DB
× Net. mon. offices
× Encryption DB
Data exfiltration DB
× Net. mon. offices
× Encryption DB
APT DB Plant Vulnerable Wi-Fi plant
× Asset Audit
Remote Control DB plant
× Patch server
× Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
× Net. mon. plant
× Encryption DB
Data exfiltration DB plant
× Net. mon. plant
× Encryption DB
APT Controller Scan plant
× Firewall plant
Remote control Controller
× Patch controller
× Firewall plant
Disruption controller
× Patch controller
Disruption controller
× Patch controller
State Intelligence Physical intrusion plant
× CCTV plant
0day DB plant
× Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
× Net. mon. plant
Data exfiltration DB plant
× Net. mon. plant
State Disruption Physical intrusion plant
× CCTV plant
Remote control controller
(0day)
Disruption controller
include the essential elements of comparable real-life systems,
despite the objective of making a simple game that non-
experts can play. The attack scenarios were designed to
be varied and representative of the current threat model
for industrial control systems [16], [22]. Table 3 includes
attacks of different natures – social engineering, cyber attacks,
physical attacks – and different degrees of sophistication. This
design choice favors players who are able to balance priorities
between these different vectors over players focusing on a
single type of threat: players are not rewarded for guessing
the one particular attack they should be concerned with, but
for identifying and countering as many different attacks as
possible. From a study perspective, this also allows us to
capture a wide variety of strategies that we can differentiate.
The infrastructure model was elaborated based on our
experience with industrial control systems. It was validated
by all the computer scientists and security experts who
played the game. The distribution of attacks took inspiration
from recent threat reports (e.g. [16], [22]) and was also
validated by the security experts who played the game.
3.6 Game design discussion
The balance between theme and mechanics was a key design
choice for D-D. The game was carefully designed in order
not to encourage a mechanics-based play (or, in role-playing
parlance, “meta-gaming”). The mechanics of the game are
kept to a strict minimum from a player perspective: 4
rounds, $100,000 budget per round, 15 defense cards and
the infrastructure are all the mechanics that they see. In
particular, the players do not have access to the attack table,
with which they would be able to understand the mechanics
of the game and optimize their strategy accordingly. Instead,
players must base their decisions on the thematic role of each
defense and how they fit into the threat environment they
are facing, which is entirely narrated.
This design choice is also enforced by the Game Master:
any meta-gaming attempt is discouraged. The Game Master
de-emphasizes game mechanics and asks the players to focus
instead on “what they would do in the real world”. The
rulebook provides guidelines for Game Masters to encourage
immersion and respond to players tempted by meta-gaming.
For instance, a typical meta-gaming behavior would com-
prise second-guessing the Game Master (for instance: “I
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bet the GM will run exactly the attack that we won’t have
defended against...”). As an answer, the Game Master can
emphasize that the attack scenarios are pre-determined and
mimick real-world conditions, reconstructed from actual
threat reports. In section 8.1 we evaluate whether players’
decisions are indeed based on immersed, theme-driven
thinking and to what extent do they rely on mechanics-based
optimization.
4 METHODOLOGY
We played D-D with a total of 43 players divided into 12
homogeneous groups:
• 4 groups of “security experts” with a background (i.e.
skills, degree and/or professional experience) in cyber-
security.
• 4 groups of “computer scientists” with a background in
computer science but not in cyber-security.
• 4 groups of “managers” with a management background
and no skills in computer science or cyber-security.
We ensured that our participants fell into these clear
categories to avoid biasing the analysis. Therefore, when
referring to players, “managers” or “computer scientists”
refer to the backgrounds described above instead of an
actual function. “Managers” were chosen as they play a
major role in decisions about security and budgets, and their
background is identifiable.
The groups featured subjects from either academia or
industry, the former being either academics, PhD students,
postgraduate or undergraduate students in the correspond-
ing areas. We cannot reveal affiliations for ethical reasons,
but all “industry” players held a position or had previous
work experience in industry. Each group is given a unique
identifier shown in Table 5 (e.g., “CI2” for the second group
of computer scientists from industry). For consistency, all
games were run by the same Game Master with expertise in
both security and games.
We advertised game sessions on our universities’ mailing
lists, asking for volunteers, and we reached out to a number
of our industry partners. Group selection was organised on a
first-come first-served basis. A £10 compensation was offered
to students. An ethics agreement was signed, guaranteeing
the confidentiality of the study and of all personal statements
recorded during the session. The recordings are kept in a
secure, encrypted location. The transcripts are anonymized
and kept confidential. The project received approval from
the relevant ethics committee.
This experimental sample is substantial for a qualitative
analysis, much larger than existing literature on security
games (e.g., [9] is based on a survey of 14 educators and
observation of 11 players). We do not claim statistical
significance: the quantitative values reported are to ground
our qualitative insights and observations, in line with the
general methodological approach taken in literature, e.g., [9],
[23].
At the end of each round, the players were invited
to write a short report detailing their investments and a
short justification behind these. In addition to these logs
of player decisions, we video-recorded all sessions with
informed consent and transcribed them, then open-coded
Fig. 3. Game scores (red cross = average).
the transcripts [11]. We analyze these two data sources using
several measurements as follows.
4.1 Game score
To measure how well the players defended their infras-
tructure, we marked each game with a Game Score that
counts how many successful attacks the players successfully
defended. In itself, the game score is not an absolute
measurement of the security skills of the players: it is one
indicator that must be considered in the context of the other
qualitative observations that this study presents.
We considered a total of 33 attacks from Script Kiddies
and Organized Crime (cf. Table 3), each successful defense
granting one point. State Attacks do not count as players
should not be trying to defend against such high-profile
threats: for instance, in round 1, defending a physical infiltra-
tion by a foreign spy with CCTV should not be considered a
good play, as it comes to the detriment of essential defenses
against more likely low-level threats. Figure 3 shows the
game score per demographics. Computer scientists achieved
the best results as a demographic, manager teams had
consistently average results, whereas some teams of security
experts ended up at the bottom of the score sheet – surprising
results that we discuss in more detail in Sections 6 and 7.
4.2 Measuring player strategies
During the game, a record is kept of all players’ investments,
round per round: this record is used to measure the players’
interest in different types of defenses. We assume that the
earlier players invest in a defense, the more important this
defense is to them. This assumption is clearly explained to
the players by the Game Master: all defenses are useful and
their budget is limited, therefore they are invited to prioritize
the defenses they deem the most important for each round.
We partition defenses into four categories and associated
measurements that capture the interest of players:
1) Data protection: How much importance is given to
protecting the company’s data (e.g., in databases, PC
hard drives) from being stolen?
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSE.2017.2782813, IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering
8
TABLE 4
Detailed investments by all teams during the game.
Team Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
Asset audit Firewall plant Firewall office Patches PCs
SA1 Patches controller Monitoring office Training Patches servers
Encryption DBs CCTV plant Antivirus
Encryption PCs Monitoring plant
Firewall plant Antivirus Training Patches servers
SA2 Firewall office Monitoring plant Monitoring office CCTV plant
Threat assessment Encryption DBs Asset audit Patches PCs
Threat assessment Firewall office Monitoring office Antivirus
SI1 Asset audit Patches PCs Monitoring plant Encryption DBs
Firewall plant Patches servers Encryption PCs
Training Patches controller
Firewall plant Patches servers Monitoring plant Monitoring office
SI2 Asset audit Antivirus CCTV office CCTV plant
Firewall office Encryption DBs
Training
Threat assessment Asset audit Patches servers Monitoring office
CA1 Firewall office Antivirus Patches controller Monitoring plant
Firewall plant Patches PCs Encryption PCs
Training Encryption DBs
Threat assessment Antivirus Patches PCs CCTV plant
CA2 Asset audit Training Patches controller CCTV office
Encryption DBs Firewall office Monitoring office
Firewall plant
Threat assessment Asset audit Training Encryption DBs
CI1 Firewall office Patches PCs CCTV plant Patches controller
Firewall plant Patches servers Monitoring office Monitoring plant
Antivirus
Threat assessment Asset audit Patches PCs CCTV plant
CI2 Training Patches servers Patches controller CCTV office
Firewall office Firewall plant Monitoring office
Encryption DBs
Antivirus CCTV plant Asset audit Monitoring plant
MA1 Firewall office Monitoring office Encryption PCs Patches servers
Firewall plant Encryption DBs Training
Patches PCs
Threat assessment Firewall plant Monitoring office Monitoring plant
MA2 Asset audit Antivirus Patches controller CCTV plant
Firewall office Encryption PCs Training
Encryption DBs
Threat assessment Asset audit Encryption DBs CCTV office
MI1 Antivirus Firewall plant Patches controller Monitoring plant
Firewall office Patches PCs Monitoring office
Patches servers
Threat assessment Asset audit Firewall plant Monitoring office
MI2 Antivirus Encryption DBs Training Monitoring plant
Firewall office Patches PCs Encryption PCs
Patches controller Patches servers
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TABLE 5
Group names and player distribution.
Academia Industry
Security SA1 (4 PhD students) SI1 (4 consultants)
experts SA2 (3 undergr. stud.) SI2 (5 consultants)
Computer CA1 (2 academics) CI1 (6 IT engineers)
scientists CA2 (4 postgrad. stud.) CI2 (4 IT engineers)
Managers
MA1 (3 postgrad. stud.) MI1 (2 managers)
MA2 (4 undergr. stud.) MI2 (2 managers)
TABLE 6
Definition of Interest Scores in defenses.
Round the defense is played 1st 2nd 3rd 4th never
Interest score for the defense 4 3 2 1 0
2) Intelligence gathering: How much importance is given
to evaluating the situation (threats, assets) before invest-
ing in actual defenses?
3) Human factors: How much importance is given to
addressing human vulnerabilities (bad security practices,
social engineering)?
4) Technological solutions: How much the players invest
in technological solutions, as opposed to the first three
categories? This category is further refined into three sub-
categories: physical security (i.e. CCTV against physical
intrusions), basic cyber security (essentials such as fire-
walls, antivirus, security patches) and advanced cyber
security (highly sophisticated network monitoring and
intrusion detection).
To quantify the interest of players in defenses, we
associate each defense with an Interest Score (IS) defined
in Table 6. For instance, if a team invests in an Antivirus
in the first round and a Security Training in round 3, the
corresponding Interest Scores for this team are:
IS(Antivirus) = 4
IS(Security Training) = 2
The interest of players in the four categories of defenses
is then measured via the following scores:
• Data Protection Score (DPS):
DPS = IS(Encryption PCs)+
IS(Encryption DBs)
• Intelligence Gathering Score (IGS):
IGS = IS(Asset Audit)+
IS(Threat Assessment)
• Human Factors Score (HFS):
HFS = IS(Security Training)
• Physical Security Score (PSS), Basic Cyber Security Score
(BCS) and Advanced Cyber Security Score (ACS):
PSS = IS(CCTV Plant) + IS(CCTV Office)
BCS = IS(Firewall P lant) + IS(Firewall Office)
+IS(Antivirus) + IS(Patches PCs)
+IS(Patches Server & DBs)
+IS(Patches Controller)
ACS = IS(Network Monitoring P lant)
+IS(Network Monitoring Office)
Figure 4 presents the measurements for each of these
scores.
4.3 Characterizing decision processes
After measuring player strategies, we analyzed the deci-
sion processes themselves via two indicators: the type and
richness of the arguments players used and the players’ con-
fidence in their own decisions. These indicators were derived
while open-coding the transcripts [11]. More precisely, each
argument used by a participant is associated with one of
the following categories, presented by decreasing levels of
maturity:
• Procedure: a participant explicitly applies a methodolog-
ical procedure. Example: “We should start with an asset
audit, then we can know what we are protecting and invest
accordingly.”
• Experience: a participant bases a decision on relevant
past experience with similar situations. Examples: “I
have never seen an IT infrastructure without a firewall.”,
“Remember the news last week? They got owned by a phishing
email, we should care about it.”
• Scenario: a participant invents a hypothetical scenario,
describing an attack or a potential situation, to illustrate
a point to other players. Example: “What if someone got
access to our database? We need to encrypt it.”
• Intuition: a participant provides no additional evidence
but their gut instinct. In the absence of one of the former
justifications, this is the default code associated with
arguments. Example: “I like the antivirus.”
Figure 5 shows, for each team, how many arguments
were used in each of these categories.
Measuring self-confidence follows a similar protocol: each
mention by participants of their confidence in their decisions
– either positive or negative – is coded. Examples: “(To the
Game Master:) you told us what we already knew.” (positive); “I
don’t know, I’m not sure.” (negative). We then computed the
total number of positive and negative self-evaluations. The
results are shown in Figure 6.
5 ANALYSIS OF PLAYER STRATEGIES
In this section we discuss player strategies in terms of
priorities in their investments (Figure 4) and their efficiency
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Fig. 4. Detailed scores for each demographics (for clarity, only teams mentioned in the text are labeled).
with respect to their game score (Figure 3). In terms of
background, we can summarize player strategies with the
following tendencies:
• Security experts were strongly attracted by Advanced
Cyber Protection and neglected Basic Cyber Protection
and Intelligence Gathering.
• Computer scientists favored Intelligence Gathering and
Human Factors while being less interested in Advanced
Cyber Protection and Data Protection.
• Managers were technology-driven (Basic and Advanced)
and focused more on Data Protection than other demo-
graphics while neglecting Human Factors.
5.1 The best players are not the ones you think
Strikingly, security experts do not get better scores than
the other two categories while providing the two worst
performances of the panel (22 points for SA1 and 26 points
for SI1 in Figure 3). Security experts were the most interested
in advanced cyber security solutions to the detriment of basic
protections (average ACS = 4 and average BCS = 13.5 in
Figure 4). The discussions steered rapidly towards deploying
“big shiny boxes” (i.e. network monitoring) in all groups of
security experts. Interestingly, the most successful team of
security experts (SI2, with a Game Score of 29 in Figure 3) did
not follow this tendency as much as other teams: they had
the lowest interest in Advanced Cyber Protection and the
highest interest in Basic Cyber Protection among all teams of
security experts (ACS = 3 and BCS = 15 in Figure 4).
Security experts also tended to neglect intelligence gather-
ing and in particular to skip threat assessments (average IGS
= 5.5 in Figure 4). A player from team SA1, who achieved
the lowest score of the panel, stated: “We are security experts,
we don’t need a threat assessment.”. Groups such as SI1 who
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Fig. 5. Count of arguments in the transcripts.
Fig. 6. Count of self-evaluation markers (no value means 0 markers were
available in the transcripts).
did invest in a threat assessment noted that they had learnt
little from it (“You told us what we already knew.”). However,
the detailed analysis of their decision processes (Section 7.3)
shows that they were not able to capitalize on the very threat
assessment they thought was obvious.
5.2 The technology-driven
Managers were technology-driven: they were the most con-
cerned with data protection (average DPS = 4.5 in Figure 4)
while having strong interest in cyber protection, both basic
and advanced (average BCS = 8 and average ACS = 3.75
respectively in Figure 4). This tendency is confirmed by in-
game reflections such as the following: “I really need to have
some software that can help me choose. I need some technical
support.”. This technology focus comes at a price: managers
were the least concerned about Human Factors (average HFS
= 1.25 in Figure 4)
It should be noted that, despite this surprising trust in
technology over humanity, none of the teams of managers
provided a bad performance. Their results were actually
quite regular, all teams scoring between 27 and 29 points
(Figure 3).
5.3 Balance is a key to success
Computer scientists were overall the most interested in non-
technological defenses: they had the highest scores in Human
Factors (average HFS = 7.5 in Figure 4) and Intelligence
Gathering (average IGS = 9 in Figure 4). As summed up
by a player from CI2: “You need to see what the problems
are before you try and fix them.”. Computer scientists also
showed a bias against Advanced Cyber Solutions in favor
of Basic Cyber Solutions (average ACS = 1.75 and average
BCS = 16 respectively in Figure 4), opposite to the strategy
of security experts. Finally, they were the least interested in
Data Protection (average DPS = 3.75 in Figure 4).
Such balanced, and not solely technology-driven, strate-
gies yielded good results: the best score of the 12 teams was
achieved by computer scientists (31 points for CI2 in Figure 3)
while the other 3 teams had average scores (27 or 28). Overall,
of the three demographics, the group of computer scientists
were the ones with the best results.
6 DECISION PROCESSES
Considering the way teams took their decisions, in terms
of arguments and self-evaluation, we identified two broad
behaviors, depending on whether teams had both experience
and technical knowledge or not. Interestingly, this classifi-
cation does not necessarily correlate with good results, as
shown in Section 5.
6.1 The intuition-driven n00bs
Team CA2 (computer science students) and the four teams
of managers (MA1 and MA2: management students, MI1
and MI2: industry managers) lacked either experience or a
technical background, and sometimes both. As a result, their
arguments were poor and mostly based on abstract intuitions:
“I think we should go for firewalls”, “I like the antivirus”. This was
particularly clear for MA1 and MA2 (management students)
and MI2 (junior managers): they barely used any other form
of argumentation, apart from a few attack scenarios. Team
CA2 (computer science students) and MI1 (senior industry
managers) used a higher proportion of scenarios and even
some procedural thinking, such as “we should go first for an
audit, then we will know what we are protecting”. Notably, these
two teams were also highly self-critical, team MI1 scoring a
record number of “I’m not sure” and “I don’t know, what do
you think?” in the transcripts.
6.2 The l33t (or are they?)
Contrary to the previous category, security experts and
experienced computer scientists mainly used rich, concrete
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scenarios to argue: “Imagine if someone compromised this box...”.
A clear difference can be seen between student groups
(teams SA1 and SA2: security students) and teams with more
experience (teams SI1 and SI2: senior security consultants,
CA1: senior academics, CI1: junior IT engineers, CI2: senior
IT engineers). The latter used their experience of the field
much more by recalling past anecdotes. They also used
procedural thinking much more often, referring explicitly
to initial intelligence gathering before investing into any
defenses. Procedural thinking was not a guarantee of quality
however: team SI1, for instance, constantly referred to their
initial threat assessment but exclusively as a justification
for a budget increase, neglecting the actual content of this
assessment and the threats they were facing – this “tunnel
vision” syndrome is discussed in Section 7.3.
Security experts showed a high degree of confidence,
maybe due to a feeling of familiarity with security issues:
their self-evaluation counters are very low and feature more
positive mentions than other demographics. When realizing
that they had been hacked, the reaction of security experts
was in general to blame the lack of budget or complain that
they had been put in a very unfavorable situation. Computer
scientists and managers, on the other hand, acknowledged
their lack of expertise in security much more: teams CA2
and MI1, for instance, were composed of highly self-critical
players. At the end of the game, they were much more
likely to acknowledge their mistakes; team CI2 was actually
surprised by their excellent result, as they were constantly
expecting a disaster to happen until the very end.
7 THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
The previous sections presented a number of patterns that
we observed in players’ decision processes: in terms of their
defensive focus, argument types and self-evaluations, and
the overall game scores of the different teams. This section
provides more detailed analysis of the transcripts, in order
to identify both positive decision patterns that yield better
results and mistakes the players made. We analyze several
transversal patterns (good, bad or ugly) that we illustrate
with characteristic plays. We invite the readers to be inspired
by the virtuous behaviors described in this catalog and to
discourage bad habits (don’t try this at home!).
7.1 Balance is key (good)
In D-D, finding a good balance between investments is
critical to answer all threats appropriately. An inspiring
example is team CI2, a group of experienced computer
scientists from industry, who played a near-perfect game. The
only way the team could have reached a higher game score
would have been to skip the Threat Assessment (assuming
the participants already had the appropriate knowledge) and
to invest in an earlier Firewall, which would have deflected
an inconsequential scan on the plant during the first round.
A few characteristic features of this team:
• They were the only team to invest in a security training
in round 1, deflecting 3 attacks at once (maximum
Human Factors Score (HFS) of 4, cf. Figure 4). As one
of the players said: “You can have all the technology in the
world, if people are still going to click on a dodgy link in an
email...”.
• They correctly identified that the offices were more
exposed than the plant, due to the public server, and
prioritized their investments on this side (early office
firewall and server patch in rounds 1 and 2).
• They delayed less critical investments (controller patch,
CCTV) to later rounds while focusing explicitly on
balancing their different defenses – technical and non-
technical, plant side and office side – according to their
evaluation of threats.
• The team had remarkably balanced discussions, every
player expressing diverging opinions. Despite their
experience, they were still self-critical (cf. self-evaluation
markers on Figure 6) and were genuinely impressed by
their good performance at the end of the game.
7.2 A little knowledge is a dangerous thing (bad)
Contrary to balanced approaches, excessive focus on particu-
lar threats leads to bad results. Team SA1 (security students)
provided the worst performance of all teams, in terms of
game score. They suffered from two major weaknesses:
• The team had an enthusiastic attraction for high-
level threats: they invested straight into encryption
for databases and PCs, by fear of data exfiltration,
followed by a very early advanced technology – network
monitoring – during round 2 (their Data Protection Score
(DPS) is the highest of all team, cf. Figure 4). Meanwhile,
their untrained personnel sitting in a non-firewalled
office with an unpatched server were hit by multiple
Script Kiddie attacks – trojan-infected email, denial of
service, compromised server – at the end of round 2
(low Basic Cyber Security Score (BCS), cf. Figure 4).
• Despite their lack of experience, the team lacked self-
criticism, one of the players notably stating that “We are
security experts, we don’t need a threat assessment” (their
self-evaluation markers are predominantly positive, cf.
Figure 6). Such a threat assessment would have precisely
shifted their attention towards more likely low-level
threats they finally cared about when it was too late.
At the end of the game, realizing how poorly they had
played, one of the players concluded: “Ignorance was
bliss.”.
7.3 The “tunnel vision” syndrome (ugly)
When a team has strong pre-conceived assumptions about
security, these can drive their decisions regardless of any con-
tradictory information or feedback collected during the game.
Team SA1, described in the previous section, were clearly
affected by tunnel vision: their focus on data protection and
advanced cyber defenses left them vulnerable to many low-
level attacks. Team SI1, a group of engineers from a cyber
security consulting firm, suffered from a similar syndrome
and neglected data protection altogether, to a bitter end:
• The senior engineer of the group stated, at the beginning
of round 1, that “this company’s data has little value: you
could publish it all”.
• After investing in a threat assessment that described a
number of potential data exfiltration attacks, the players
signaled to the Game Master: “you told us what we already
knew.”. Yet they kept giving a very low priority to data
encryption.
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• At the end of round 2, they were hit by a minor data
exfiltration attack, and still they did not change their
plans and delayed encryption investments in favor of
more protection against disruptive attacks. The senior
engineer explicitly said: “I don’t feel the encryption is any
priority even though there has been a data breach.”.
• It took two major data exfiltrations during round 3,
from both the plant and office databases, for the players
to concede that encryption was important: they finally
encrypted their databases during round 4, too late to
stop ongoing attacks.
These two examples also show the risk of self-supported
expertise: these two teams of experts had high confidence
and little self-criticism. Therefore, they could not adapt to
unforeseen attacks despite the relevant information being
given to them. Interestingly, both of these teams expressed
contempt for non-experts, using the exact same expression:
“Users are idiots.”.
7.4 Beware of the champion (for better or for worse)
Although teams take decisions collectively, individuals had
a significant influence on the outcome of several games.
Champions supporting their ideas with strong arguments
were able to convince the rest of the team, for better or for
worse. Conversely, some players failed to become effective
champions for their cause and were silenced by stronger, yet
wrong, arguments:
• Team CI2 (the perfect runner) was implicitly led by
a senior engineer who pushed for an early security
training, then directed the team’s reflections according to
his (correct) assessment of the risks for the infrastructure.
• One of the players in team SA1 (high-tech driven worst
scorers) tried to argue in favor of investing in more basic
defenses and considering human factors, yet his voice
was not heard by his teammates.
• Team SI1 (second worst scorers) suffered from a tunnel
vision syndrome partly because the senior engineer in
the room disregarded the risks of data exfiltration.
• Team SI2 (second best scorer) played quite similarly
to SI1, until one player with decades of experience in
information assurance managed to convince the team to
encrypt their databases, unknowingly preventing two
catastrophic data exfiltration attacks – attacks that did
hit SI1.
Here, it should be noted that the Game Master ensured
a certain fairness during the debates by trying to balance
speaking times among players. In real-world contexts, some
less-vocal players would not have got the exposure they were
given during the game and their influence on their team’s
decisions would have been even weaker.
7.5 The beginner’s syndrome (good)
A lack of experience can be compensated by open-minded-
ness and adaptability to the inputs provided by the game.
Opposite to some teams of security experts falling for
their pre-conceptions, all teams of managers and computer
scientists reached at least a relatively good score.
• Despite their lack of expertise, they were able to capi-
talize on information gathering: All non-expert teams,
MA1 excepted, went for an Asset Audit and Threat
Assessment during the first two rounds and interpreted
it correctly.
• They did not suffer from excessive tropisms that could
have put their defenses off-balance – such as an immod-
erate focus on data protection (SA1), a complete lack of
consideration for data protection (SI1) or high interest
in advanced cyber solutions (all security experts).
• They were constantly critical about themselves and their
approach to the game (cf. Figure 6). Non-expert teams
particularly praised the game for its educational value,
which is discussed in more detail in Section 9.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
8.1 Influence of game mechanics
Players of a role-playing game such as D-D design their
strategy based on two factors:
• Mechanics, i.e. investing in the defenses they think will
optimally counter the game’s attack scenario, in order
to “win” the game.
• Theme, i.e. investing in the defenses they would invest in
if they were facing the same situation in the real world.
D-D explicitly encourages theme-based play so that
player decisions reflect their understanding of real-world
security. In order to assess how theme-driven and how
mechanics-driven the players were, we asked them to justify
each of their investments with a short written sentence. We
gathered 117 such justifications across the 12 games we
played, and we classified it as follows:
• 109 theme-driven justifications that unambiguously
adopt an immersed, in-game perspective, for instance:
“We need to identify what we are protecting.” to justify
an Asset Audit, “Data is the brain of the company and
it shouldn’t be vulnerable.” to justify encrypting the
databases.
• 5 mechanics-driven justifications that unambiguously
leverage a game mechanic, namely the round-based
structure of the game (for instance: “Can’t afford all
options on table - so do this first as gives benefit!! [sic]”) or
the attack scenarios (for instance: “[This defense is] more
likely to stop insider threat and nation-state than CCTV.”).
• 3 ambiguous justifications that all refer to ongoing
attacks known by the players and for which we could
not clearly determine whether the players were thinking
in-game or meta-gaming, for instance: “Something is
going on in the office and we need to understand what.”.
Overall, 93% of the justifications relied on a theme-driven
strategy, which confirms that D-D does indeed achieve its
goal of immersing the players and recording their real-world
perception. In the future, we plan on studying the influence
of varying game mechanics, for instance, by changing the
price of defenses, changing the attack scenarios, changing
the infrastructure.
8.2 Influence of sample size
Although our sample size is significant for a qualitative
analysis, it is not so for a quantitative analysis. We ran t-
tests to assess whether there was a statistically significant
difference between the distributions of the 6 Defence Scores
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TABLE 7
P-values from pairwise t-tests between Score distributions from different demographics.
Data BasicCyber AdvancedCyber Physical Human Intelligence Game Score
Security experts vs. Computer scientists 0.545 0.121 0.029 1 0.359 0.164 0.254
Security experts vs. Managers 0.780 0.218 0.134 0.791 0.076 0.774 0.327
Computer scientists vs. Managers 0.284 1 0.155 0.767 0.033 0.427 0.660
and the Game Score for our three demographics. Results
are shown in Table 7. There are no statistically significant
differences, apart from two exceptions (out of 21 t-tests):
security experts and computer scientists differ significantly
on their AdvancedCyber score (p-value 0.029 < 0.05), and
computer scientists and managers differ significantly on their
Human score (p-value 0.033 < 0.05). These results hold after
correcting for multiple testing, using Bonferroni correction.
We do not claim statistical significance, and future work will
focus on improving the statistical relevance of our results
– namely by collecting and analysing a much larger set of
games.
Another limitation of our approach is the lack of scala-
bility of our qualitative analysis. Transcribing, coding and
interpreting a single game transcript requires a significant
amount of manual work from several qualified researchers.
We are exploring potential ways of speeding up the analysis
phase. We are currently considering automating some parts
of it, for instance, via Natural Language Processing tools,
while preserving the in-depth understanding of player
decision processes it provides.
9 D-D BEYOND THE EXPERIMENT
Beyond its utility as a semi-controlled environment for exper-
iments, D-D is intended to serve a number of purposes. All
teams provided positive feedback after the game, although
different backgrounds appreciated different aspects of D-D.
9.1 Educational training
Non-expert teams were extremely positive regarding the
educational value of the game. Several management students
reported to their teachers that they wished D-D had been
part of their regular curriculum, as it provided them with
an “informative and knowledgeable” introduction to cyber
security, IT infrastructures and decision making. Before the
game, players answered questions about their background
and their familiarity with IT, security and industrial control
systems (cf. Table 8). After the game they evaluated how
much they had learnt during the session about these topics
(cf. Table 9). As can be seen from the table, managers were
extremely positive regarding the educational value of D-D.
Making D-D a full-fledged tabletop game that can be used
for educational purposes is the major objective for future
work.
9.2 Corporate practice and communication
Industry participants in general were all interested in having
D-D played in their organization with mixed audiences: for
instance, having a CEO, a board director, a CISO and an IT
engineer play the game together to discover their different
cultures and build a common understanding of cyber security.
TABLE 8
Pre-session background assessment from managers (11 players in total).
Q: How would you rate your proficiency in computer science?
No particular training 6
Some technical knowledge 3
Significant training or practice 2
Expert 0
Q: How would you rate your proficiency in cyber security?
No particular training 8
Some technical knowledge 2
Significant training or practice 1
Expert 0
Q: How familiar are you with industrial control systems?
Never heard the term before 5
Heard about it, but not sure what it is exactly 5
Familiar with it 1
Expert in the domain 0
TABLE 9
Post-session feedback from managers (11 players in total).
Q: What did you learn about computer science?
Nothing 1
A few things 8
A lot 2
Q: What did you learn about cyber security?
Nothing 0
A few things 6
A lot 5
Q: What did you learn about industrial control systems?
Nothing 2
A few things 5
A lot 4
Participants with a governmental experience also praised
the informative qualities of the game. Several teams made
inquiries about future commercial versions of the game and
expressed interest in the results of our study.
Industry participants also praised D-D as a game: “very
enjoyable and well-constructed game” supported by a “nice
design” and a “good visual design” that delivered “good
fun” are some examples of the verbal and written feedback
provided by players. The board and its elements in particular
were explicitly appreciated by players from all backgrounds,
as it provided a support for visualization and helped focusing
the debates.
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9.3 Extending D-D
In terms of the future objectives for D-D, a number of
extensions to the game will be explored:
• A Game Master’s guide for building new infrastructures
and attack scenarios. Such an extension could increase
the complexity of the game model so that companies
can replicate their own infrastructure and threat environ-
ment for training purposes. This would also allow the
game to be played several times by the same players in
different settings (new infrastructure, new attack vectors,
new attackers, new game objectives).
• A “red team vs. blue team” version where a separate
team of attackers is also given a budget and objec-
tives (“exfiltrate the HR data”, “disrupt the SCADA
controller”). The game then becomes an adversarial
challenge between two teams that must handle partial
information and anticipate their opponents’ next move.
This extension was particularly popular among security
experts and computer scientists: several players infor-
mally asked to be registered for the (potential future)
tests of this extension.
• A software version that would allow single players
to play D-D individually, or several players to play
without the need for a Game Master. Removing the
Game Master would lead to a different experience
altogether, as the Game Master has a central role in
directing and interacting with the players, answering
their questions, providing additional information and
background, and ensuring fairness in their debates.
A software version, on the other hand, sacrifices this
central human dimension for the sake of portability
and convenience: many players would be able to play
this version of the game with minimal constraints and
investments.
In order to catalyse the diffusion of the D-D and encour-
age the development of new versions of it, the rules of the
game have been made public under a Creative Commons
licence. They can be freely downloaded at:
http://decisions-disruptions.org
10 CONCLUSION
In today’s complex organizations and connected infrastruc-
tures, little is understood about security decisions and the
impact of various factors and biases behind them. It is
essential to promote cultural bridges that allow different
demographics to build a common understanding of the “how”
and “why” of the issues at play. In this paper, we proposed
Decisions & Disruptions, a game that allows participants
from various backgrounds to experiment with and reflect
on their approaches to security decisions. The analysis of 12
games reveals several key insights:
• Strategic priorities and decision processes differed be-
tween demographics: Security experts had a strong in-
terest in advanced technological solutions. They tended
to neglect intelligence gathering, due to strong self-
confidence in their knowledge and expertise. How-
ever, this self-confidence was often not balanced by
a willingness to reflect and critique their decisions.
Managers were also technology-driven and focused on
data protection while neglecting human factors. Their
debates were mostly driven by intuition but did not
lead to disastrous decisions. Computer scientists tended
to balance human factors and intelligence gathering
with technical solutions, and demonstrated a strong
willingness to question their decisions. The above in-
sights can be valuable when conducting requirements
gathering or prioritization workshops with stakeholders
from different backgrounds within an organization—the
requirements engineer can be cognisant of these cultural
biases and, when such patterns manifest, can take
mitigating actions by exploring the rationale behind
particular stakeholder decisions.
• Participants with a technical background and/or ex-
perience were not necessarily better players: Some
teams of confident but over-focused experts achieved
mediocre results, compared to inexperienced or non-
technical players who better adapted to the various
threats they were facing. Expertise was therefore not
necessarily successful unless it had the willingness
to question its pre-conceptions. This demonstrates the
importance of incorporating so-called lay perspectives
during security requirements engineering—non-experts
possess invaluable business and operational knowledge
that can contextualize the security risks and decisions
pertaining to their mitigation.
• Various characteristic patterns and their influence on
security decisions manifested across the 12 games:
“balance is key” (good), “little knowledge” (bad), “tunnel
vision” (ugly), “beware of the champion” (ambivalent),
“beginner’s syndrome” (good). Such patterns identify
both good practices and typical errors and pitfalls to be
avoided. D-D can, therefore, serve as a means for stake-
holders to explore their perceptions and understandings
of security risks, the trade-offs involved during decision-
making and the impact of such decisions on the security
of the overall system.
Beyond the scope of this particular experiment, we invite
readers to consider their own security decisions in the light
of our findings: Do any of these patterns sound familiar?
On which side of the spectrum does the reader belong?
Promoting good approaches and, above all, discouraging
bad habits and ugly mistakes is of paramount importance
in a world where cyber security is becoming a concern for
everyone. Through games such as D-D, one can experiment
with one’s own attitude towards cyber security, reflect as to
which patterns manifest in one’s decisions, and hopefully
end up on the good side of the spectrum.
Finally, D-D is a sandbox with clear educational value, as
consistently noted by our participants. The game provides a
didactic way of discovering cyber security for players with
varying degrees of expertise. In corporate environments, D-
D has the potential to become a strong communication and
awareness-raising tool that allows players from different
backgrounds – CEO, CISO, managers, IT engineers – to
sit around a table, build a common understanding of
security issues and bootstrap or consolidate their security
requirements.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
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